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China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The relationship between the People’s Republic
of China (PRC or China) and countries in Latin America transcends economic collaboration.
Culture, language, diet, infrastructure, and technology are continuously transformed through
this relationship. Over time, the relationship has
altered the landscapes too: China is now the
main trading partner for those Latin American
countries that have kept their traditional roles
as providers of raw materials. The increased
demand for commodities is impacting natural
resources and local peoples at a time when
climate change makes sustainability practices
most urgent.
Latin America needs to revise its practices and
prioritize the efficient management of land, water, minerals, and waste to evolve in this relationship. For many industries, Chinese investments and trade increased when the region
was already at capacity supplying its domestic markets and other Western countries. Latin
American countries are facing the challenge of
adapting to this increased demand while ensuring social and environmental sustainability in
their territories.
This report aims to contribute to a nuanced
view of Chinese investments and trade. In many
cases, it shows how unsustainability is not the
result of the practices of Chinese companies
but rather the nature of the resource, local legal
frameworks, or global industry standards. The
report also highlights cases in which poor decision-making by both Chinese companies and
Latin American countries is driving resource extraction to a tipping point.
The sectors analyzed include three of the commodities most traded with China: soy, copper,
and beef. Two additional cases anticipate the
impact that the growing demand for lithium and
pork can generate in Latin America in light of
the imperative to scale up climate action and
halt environmental degradation.

The extraction of lithium and production of soy
for the Chinese market is not more damaging
environmentally than the operations of other
Western companies. Considering the national
legal frameworks applicable to these industries, Chinese investments and trade in these
sectors are not inherently different; other countries would likely implement the same practices.
What is unique to China’s demand is its scope;
it has the capacity to process and consume
enormous quantities of commodities at a level
far surpassing that of other countries. In light
of this reality, Latin American countries must
devise development plans for these industries
and not rely solely on voluntary sustainability
standards adopted by the private sector.
Beef production in Brazil provides a good example of how the local legal framework determines
the impact of an economic activity; legal loopholes allow and even incentivize environmental degradation. Foreign demand is indirectly
linked to deforestation and the appropriation
of indigenous lands; beef purchased by China
has a larger probability of being connected to
the clearing of land. These conditions could be
improved if the PRC increased its sustainable
sourcing requirements and standards.
Legal frameworks play a similar role in the socio-environmental conflicts surrounding the
Las Bambas copper mine in Peru. This case is
not representative of how Chinese mining companies operate in the country but shows how
decisions on a global scale, such as mergers,
can lead to local conflict if the national authorities are unprepared to oversee relationships
between the company and the local population.
This report recognizes both challenges and opportunities in the China-Latin America relationship as it looks toward the future. China has become an important ally in adopting renewable
energy technologies in Latin America, thus contributing to its climate change mitigation goals.
But the rising demand for agricultural commodities such as pork poses epidemiological risks
and promotes environmental degradation beyond the local impact that industrial pork farming may cause in a country such as Argentina,
which is interested in expanding these farms.
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A final section emphasizes the urgency of
adopting better production practices and preserving Latin America’s vulnerable ecosystems,
especially in light of climate change.

INTRODUCTION: A NUANCED
APPROACH TO THE CHINALATIN AMERICA RELATIONSHIP
This report acknowledges two seemingly opposing truths. First, Latin American countries
have benefited greatly from their partnership
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), and there is potential to continue engaging
in a beneficial relationship. Second, SouthSouth engagement is driving Latin American
countries’ natural resource exploitation and environmental degradation to a tipping point, with
the risk of irreversibly affecting local ecosystems and livelihoods.
Latin American countries have voluntarily entered trade and investment relationships with
the PRC and continue to enthusiastically explore new Chinese markets for their products.
The issue, however, is that the region’s unsustainable production practices have remained
unchanged, maintaining the same standards
that predated the boom in Chinese demand for
Latin American products. The rise in sheer volume created by Chinese demand when climate
change preparedness is increasingly urgent has
added to the existing environmental risks created by traditional production practices.
The region has benefited greatly from its growing
economic relationship with the PRC: Countries
have been able to access financial resources,
fill their transportation and energy infrastructure gaps, and secure a steady demand for their
products. More recently, the PRC has become a
valuable ally to fight the COVID-19 pandemic;
multiple Chinese actors made supplies available
through what’s been called “mask diplomacy.”1
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Despite economic growth, a debate is growing
among civil society and conservation organizations in the region over the unforeseen impacts
of infrastructure projects. Lending conditions,
especially those of resource-backed loans, are
being questioned and deemed “debt traps’” by
some,2 and the pressure that increased commodity production puts on nature has contributed to conditions that spark environmental
inequity and socio-environmental conflict with
local communities. This has raised a pressing
question, prevalent among the region’s longtime partners: Is the China-Latin America relationship beneficial to the latter?
The answer is not straightforward. The specific context of each trade relationship or project
provides nuances that need to be addressed
carefully considering the actors involved, the
timing of the collaboration (whether investment,
aid, or trade), and the nature of compounding
environmental degradation.
In the first half of 2020, PRC actors entered into
agreements with Latin American countries to
provide medical supplies and vaccines. This occurred when the world’s pharmaceutical companies’ production was insufficient to serve
developing countries. The Sinovac and Sinopharm3 vaccines were the first to arrive in many
Latin American countries, allowing them to immunize their healthcare workers and, in some
cases, politicians.
The international community, and the United
States, in particular, have since taken a step
forward, announcing generous support to developing regions in the form of medical supplies
and technical assistance. More than 10 million
people in Latin America will have access to Pfizer vaccines due to the Biden administration’s
policies4 and the increasing donations5 of Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine doses. This collaboration
will certainly raise immunity in Latin American
countries, given the relative effectiveness of
the Pfizer vaccine for COVID-19 variants, compared to the lesser effectiveness of Sinovac
and Sinopharm to viral mutations.

China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

In the eyes of country leaders, the PRC-Latin
America relationship has been deemed essential, strengthened through strategic partnerships
with many of the region’s countries. During his
2008 tour through the region, then-President
Hu Jintao emphasized his government’s willingness to build a relationship based on equality,
mutual benefit, and shared development for the
people of China and Latin America.6 Chinese
President Xi Jinping has stressed these same
principles, which guide many of China’s bilateral
agreements, such as the memorandum of understanding for the Belt and Road Initiative that
19 Latin American countries have signed.
However important these principles may seem,
achieving equitable mutual benefit in the
PRC-Latin American trade and investment relationship remains a challenge. Throughout their
history together, Latin America has maintained
its role as a provider of natural resources, at a
high cost to its local ecology and communities.
The strategic partnership has benefited the
parties unevenly; nine of the ten Latin American
countries that have entered strategic partnerships with China are abundant in commodities
essential for sustaining Chinese growth.7
China’s growing demand for minerals and agricultural products has made Latin American
countries highly reliant on a single partner and
transformed local landscapes to suit the international demand for these commodities. The
growing demand, concentrated in extractive
and agricultural products, gives this trade relationship a distinctly different environmental
footprint than that of other exports: it is more
carbon- and water-intensive and has heavy impacts on highly biodiverse areas inhabited by
Indigenous peoples.8
Socio-environmental practices of Chinese companies are not inherently different or worse
than those of their western counterparts. However, the scale at which production is required,
added to previous internal and international demand, is becoming unsustainable and increasing vulnerability at multiple levels.

Moreover, markets in which Chinese companies participate are already highly concentrated
globally. Antitrust processes accompany many
of its investments in the lithium and copper industries; both are included in this report. Concentration is perceived not only in the global
market for commodities but also in the local
availability of land; claims of land grabbing have
accompanied the Chinese demand for agricultural commodities, despite unclear data.

SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES
ACROSS LARGE-SCALE TRADED
COMMODITIES
Can social and environmental impacts be attributed to China’s trade and investments relationship with Latin America? As is explained
below, the answer relies on a case-by-case
evaluation rather than generalizations of how
Chinese companies perform.
Four cases are presented across renewable
and non-renewable resources. Each explores
what practices proved the most impactful and
whether they were inherent to Chinese corporate behavior or the characteristics of Chinese
demand.
Ultimately, the question that accompanies this
analysis is, are the investments different because they are linked to China’s demand for
commodities? Or is the impact expected given
industry practices, applicable legal frameworks,
and the nature of the resources?
The first two cases, the extraction of lithium in
Chile and the production of soy in Argentina,
have not been found to cause excessive environmental damage when compared to operations by other western companies.
SQM, the lithium company in which the Tianqi
Lithium company acquired 24 percent participation, is not different from other companies
that mine for lithium (and water) in the Atacama
Desert. The nature of the resource, hosted in
underground brine, and the Chilean legal framework make mining for lithium in the desert an
extremely water-intensive activity.
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Applicable legal frameworks also determine the
kind of opposition this participation has encountered. The transaction through which Tianqi
became a shareholder in SQM faced opposition
from the company’s former leadership, which
channeled complaints through the national
competition agency and delayed the acquisition. The operation has also been challenged by
Indigenous peoples experiencing severe water
scarcity due to the mining operations and the
government’s lack of an adequate response.
As for soy production, there is no question that
China’s demand is significantly higher than that
of other countries. Accusations of land grabbing
have found their way into the public discourse,
but, as this report shows, there’s no clarity on
the actual amount of land controlled by Chinese
investments. This is partly due to the diversity
of strategies that players in the agro-industrial
sector are adopting (buying land, renting land,
company-community contracts), strategies that
are not exclusive to Chinese companies.
The third case, covering beef production in Brazil, provides another example of how the local
legal framework determines the impact of the
activity. In this case, the effect of deforestation
and indigenous misappropriation is indirect.
Several studies have been needed to determine
how Chinese demand is different from other
countries. Recent findings show that Chinese
demand for beef does entail a higher deforestation risk, which would improve if the country adopted better sourcing standards, such as sanitary requirements and slaughterhouse approval
processes.
Lastly, a unique case of copper extraction in
Peru shows how global authorities can regulate
a change of management that would affect local community development plans and environmental rights, despite complying with national
legal frameworks. These issues could be foretold by Latin American countries, to thus center
transparency and public participation and prevent the risks of long-term socio-environmental
conflict.
The following section presents two cases of
growing demand for commodities, warning of
potential environmental degradation and social
conflict. The lessons learned should inform Latin American countries’ preparedness and improve management decisions moving forward.
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Trade-offs in the rise of lithium extraction in
Chile
Lithium is expected to add to the demand for
Latin America’s minerals for new energy technologies, with the added complication that
many of Latin America’s lithium reserves are
embedded in local water sources. This makes
extraction cheap in technological terms but
costly in terms of water security and socio-environmental conflict with local communities.
By 2025, the demand for lithium is expected to
increase to almost 1 million tons per year; by
2030, lithium could increase to nearly 10 times
its current market size.9 By examining how
mining has been carried out in the past, Latin American countries will hopefully implement
more sustainable and participatory regulations
for the increasing opportunities that lithium is
expected to create.
The quick adoption of renewable energy generation, storage, and electromobility technologies worldwide is unmistakably playing a pivotal
role in meeting global climate change mitigation
goals. However, experts argue that from a local
perspective, the minerals required for this transition are extracted under the same productive
and historical conditions operating for centuries in Latin America, much to the expense of
its Indigenous communities and local natural
resources, thus creating new unsustainability.10
The increased need for energy storage devices
(lithium-ion batteries for solar panels, personal
gadgets, mobile phones, and electric vehicles)
has driven the demand for lithium to double in
the last decade,11 with further projected growth
as the world continues to adopt green technologies and renewable energy generation.
In order to understand the impact of increased
lithium mining, this report looks at the socio-environmental issues arising from lithium
extraction in the Chilean Atacama Desert. Chile
is the second-largest exporter of lithium worldwide, an essential mineral for transitioning away
from fossil fuels. Along with Chile, lithium deposits in Bolivia and Argentina are known as the
“lithium triangle” and account for about half of
lithium reserves worldwide.

China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

In May 2018, the publicly-traded Chinese company Tianqi Lithium acquired 24 percent participation in the Chilean SQM (Sociedad Química y
Minera de Chile), a leading producer of lithium
worldwide and one of two extractive companies
operating in the Atacama Desert. Tianqi Lithium
purchased the stock from Nutrien Ltd., a Canadian fertilizer company, after approval from the
Chilean competition authority.
This acquisition is regarded as the biggest
transaction seen in the Santiago stock market and required approval of the Chilean Antitrust Tribunal.12 It was feared that the Chinese
company’s partnership with SQM’s competitor,
Albemarle, through a lithium mine in Australia,
could threaten the development of its Atacama
business.
The transaction was momentarily halted due
to a notable case brought forward by SQM’s
stakeholder Grupo Pampa under allegations of
a lack of transparency. The Chilean Constitutional Tribunal dismissed the accusations and
allowed the acquisition to move forward. Grupo
Pampa, a conglomerate of agricultural and mining companies, holds 30 percent in SQM and is
controlled by Julio Ponce, who had been “forced
to step down as chairman of SQM in April 2015
amid a scandal over payments to politicians,”
and rejoined amid the antitrust complaint.13
To date, SQM and Albemarle are the only actors
extracting lithium in Chile. Tianqi Lithium is now
a partner to companies within the two economic
groups: Albemarle in Australia and SQM in Chile.
What makes Chilean lithium particularly attractive to the international market is the low cost of
extraction. The country’s mineral deposits are
in complex aquifer systems below the Atacama
Desert. They serve an important ecological and
cultural role, especially to the area’s Indigenous
communities, for whom the impacts of lithium
extraction affect their livelihoods directly. The
lithium companies in Atacama are no strangers
to socio-environmental conflict: Since 2016,
there has been a dispute over water use between SQM and the local communities before
the Superintendence of the Environment.14

The reserves of the Atacama salt flats are considered “the cheapest exploitation in terms of
cost worldwide” by its local mining workers,15
and as having “no use other than as a resource,
as a mineral” by mining companies in the area,
as declared by the president of Albemarle.16
Lithium mining is water mining; the mineral is
extracted as a component of the brine through
a process that requires pumping large volumes
of liquids to evaporate the water and process
the minerals contained in the brine. According
to Barbara Jerez, Ingrid Garcés, and Robinson
Torres,17 lithium mining companies extract over
two million liters of fresh and saline water daily
from the Atacama salt flats. SQM is authorized
to extract between 1,500 and 1,700 liters per
second (l/s) of brine, compared to Albemarle’s
442 l/s. Both operations are authorized to extract freshwater—SQM with 240 l/s and Albemarle 23.5 l/s.
This level of water extraction is worrisome, and
the effects of the last decades of exploitation
have not been fully identified. CORFO, the Chilean Corporación de Fomento de la Producción,
has warned that the exploitation of the salt flats’
water far exceeds its recharge capacity. Notably, both SQM and Albemarle extract water from
roughly the same aquifer and are in constant
competition for access to the same resources.
If it were not for lithium extraction, the water
in the salt flats would have equivalent inflows
and outflows, balancing the natural regime of
this ecosystem, but the current extracting rates
surpass historical recordings of water availability by 26 percent.18 Local farmers in San Pedro
de Atacama are perceiving a water shortage and
decrease in agricultural activities that impacts
their livelihoods and food security and fractures
the social fabric of their communities.19
The transition to green energy is a global phenomenon currently led by China’s manufacturing capacity. However, if Chinese companies
were not extracting lithium or producing lithium-ion batteries, it is likely that a different
actor would step in and fill the void left in this
growing market.

Nonetheless, the Chilean government regards
brine and water resources as mining deposits,
not an underground hydrological system.
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Again, conflict and pressure over natural resources are not exclusively Chinese. These extraction strategies are in line with what Latin
America has traditionally practiced. Likewise,
the vulnerability being experienced by the Atacama communities is tied to the definition that
the Chilean government is using to manage its
resources, by considering brine as a mining deposit, and not part of an underground hydrological system.

Evidence shows that deforestation is not inherent to Chinese demand for agricultural products, but the scope of its demand causes an
increased impact on natural resources. Countries like Brazil and Argentina have become dependent on Chinese demand for beef and soy.
Despite initiatives to adopt sustainable production standards, these industries remain linked
to deforestation and forest fires to clear agricultural land.

It is likely that, in a different situation, the exploitation of lithium salt flats would be carried
out in the same way, with other actors following
the same governance rules. It is the scope and
capacity for transformation of the resources
that are inherently Chinese. The PRC’s pace of
processing raw materials into new technology
and influencing their widespread adoption is
the real challenge for Latin American countries.
Whether the region can keep up with these requirements sustainably will determine if their
partnership with China contributes to achieving “the South American industrial and energy
dream.”20

The PRC has become reliant on food grown
elsewhere, expanding its investments in the
agricultural sector worldwide. While about 20
percent of the global population lives in China,
its territory only has 9 percent of the world’s
arable land for livestock or agriculture. On the
contrary, Latin America and the Caribbean have
a population of approximately 600 million and
as much as 30 percent of the world’s surface
area suitable for agricultural activities.21

The characteristics of this demand are fundamentally Chinese. Now, it’s Latin America’s turn
to establish what kind of exploitation is intrinsically Latin American. Countries have the upper
hand in establishing regulations applicable to
resources within their territories. Thus far, they
are failing to adapt to these new challenges.
Agro-industrial activities, land tenure, and
local vulnerability
Multiple factors drive deforestation in Latin
American countries, including transportation
infrastructure, illegal extraction of minerals
and timber, land grabbing, expansion of urban
areas, weakening environmental regulations,
and—most relevant to our analysis—agricultural activities. The main concern is that the international market, China in particular, could be
driving deforestation with its increased demand
for commodity production.
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In turn, Chinese demand for agricultural commodities has helped buffer Latin America from
adverse economic shocks. The PRC remained a
critical trading partner through the global effects of the 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis
and has been a significant factor in Brazil’s robust economy throughout the fall of commodity
prices in 2011 and 2012, poor fiscal management, and the political crisis that affected the
economy from 2014 to 2016.
While shielded from global crises and internal mismanagement by this partnership, Latin
American countries are becoming sensitive to
changes in the Chinese economy. When China’s
growth slowed by 2 to 3 percentage points in
2013-14 and remained steady at 6 to 7 percent
since, Argentina and Brazil “felt the full force of
a negative GDP shock from China,”22 with average growth rates and per capita income dropping precipitously between 2014 and 2017.
Similarly, after a 7.5 percent fall in exports during
2020, the Mercosur economy was tempered
due to the quick recovery of the Chinese economy. In this scenario, the Comisión Económica
para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) reports
that export flows between Mercosur countries
and the PRC continued to gain significance to
the detriment of regional destinations.23 With
this tendency, export flows also continued their
trend toward the increasing importance of primary goods.24

China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

Having built this reliance, a large proportion of
the countries’ natural resources were committed to China. By 2016, China accounted for 13.1
percent of Argentina’s trade, and Argentina 0.3
percent of China’s; China accounted for 18.1
percent of Brazil’s trade, and Brazil 1.8 percent
of China’s.25 The sheer volume of this demand
and the reliance on local livelihoods make it
essential to rethink the conditions under which
investments occur.
Beef and soy are some of the main commodities
sold by Brazil and Argentina to China.26 Due to
the quick upturn in production, there have been
allegations of land grabbing and deforestation
through foreign direct investments, spread
through the media. They have not transcended
beyond mere rumors,27 partially given the lack
of data behind these accusations.
The following two cases address whether there
is a direct or indirect relationship between Chinese demand, deforestation, and land grabbing.
Additionally, it will outline other potential impacts of the relationship between Latin America and China by addressing an ongoing project:
relocating industrial pork farms from China to
Argentina.
Soy farming and land-use change in Argentina
China’s demand for soybeans is mainly due to
its growing need for animal feed and cooking
oil. Its soy consumption increased from 10 to
83 million tons between the early 1990s and
2014,28 with the country importing more than
80 percent of the soybeans consumed globally
in 2012.29
Much of this demand has fallen on Latin American countries, which supply approximately 60
percent of the soy imported by China (the remaining 40 percent is grown in North America),30
with Argentina and Brazil becoming the leading
producers. China bought as much as 71 percent
of Argentina’s soybean production in 2013, and
4.95 percent of Brazil’s the following year.31

Chinese companies dominate global investments in the agricultural sector. The nature of
their investments makes it hard to determine
the precise form in which these companies
dominate the supply chain and investment.
Agro-industrial investors worldwide, not exclusively those from the PRC but Western companies as well, have adopted multiple strategies
to secure their supply, including land acquisitions, rentals, and company-community contracts. The fear of occupation added to the uncertainty of how much land is in foreign hands
has sparked notable rumors of land grabbing,32
primarily targeting Chinese companies.
Out of Chinese companies’ agricultural foreign
direct investments, about 50 percent is destined to food systems.33 But there is currently
no consensus on what the total area controlled
by Chinese actors amounts to, nor is there
clear evidence of government support in recent
years for overseas “land grabbing.” Moreover,
ownership of land by Chinese companies has
reportedly been impeded by the regulations
in place in Brazil and Argentina, which restrict
land ownership for foreigners.34 Despite these
difficulties, it is important to note that, like their
multinational counterparts, Chinese actors are
interested not just in buying land but also in investing across the production chain.35
While Chinese management of agricultural projects may not be substantially different from
that of other agribusiness actors, the tenure of
land by foreign companies entails an increased
risk of the dispossession of local communities,
particularly peasant and Indigenous people’s
land, access to water, and exposure to agrochemicals.
To inform the discussion regarding the impacts
of land tenure, multiple sources have tried to
determine the scale of land under property or
rented by Chinese companies. Regional estimates vary from one million hectares (ha) of
farmland in Latin America36 to “only” 300,000
ha.37 Other calculations, such as Land Matrix,
report around 500,000 ha, whereas the International Institute for Sustainable Development
says nearly 800,000 ha were purchased or
leased by China.38
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Margaret Myers and Jie Guo, who collected the
previous information,39 found that “many of the
deals reported in land grab studies and databases (therefore accounting for their larger
numbers) have yet to materialize or have fallen through entirely, leading to a considerable
disparity in reporting. In fact, after an extensive
review of reported land grabs in Latin America,
this paper’s numbers are far lower than any of
those reported thus far; just over 70,000 hectares of land have either been purchased outright or leased by China for crop cultivation.”
Moreover, García,40 based on data available in
Land Matrix and research conducted by Borras41 and Myers and Guo,42 has estimated that
the amount of land China holds in Latin America
and the Caribbean to develop agricultural activities amounts to 122,577 ha, acquired over 18
years. Per this estimation, approximately 37,463
ha are used for soybean cultivation, with Brazil
(44,097 ha), Argentina (22,085 ha), and Jamaica (18,000 ha) leading the list of countries with
the largest area committed.43 Of this total, the
author identifies that most of the countries with
reported land grabbing are “institutionally solid,
with clear regulatory frameworks and political
stability.”44
The high profitability obtained by soybean cultivation has generated reconfigurations in Argentina. Gras and Gobel45 found the cultivation
of this commodity in the Pampas region (central area of the country) advanced on lands that
were previously dedicated to cattle raising (for
milk and meat production), significantly reduced
the cattle stock and availability for the local
market. It also reduced the cultivation of agricultural products for local consumption, such as
wheat, corn, and sunflowers. In the non-Pampas regions, soybean crops displaced rice, cotton, and vegetables. In addition to changes in
land use, the main consequences include the
expansion of the agricultural frontier and the
dispossession of criollos’ and Indigenous peoples’ lands.
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Eighty percent of Argentina’s soybean production between 2018 and 2019 was destined for
the Chinese market in the form of beans, oil,
flour, and pellets. Despite the impacts generated by the crops, there were few efforts to build
an integral sustainable strategy and much interest in persevering in the trade relationship.
President Alberto Fernández has claimed that
Argentina is working to actively reaffirm its integral strategic association with China.
In the absence of said policies, sustainability
practices have been left to private sector initiatives. Market-driven solutions have arisen to
ensure soy is sourced from deforestation- and
conversion-free land. While they constitute important efforts to transform the sector, these
initiatives cannot substitute for the role of the
state, especially when it comes to guaranteeing
the rights of local and Indigenous peoples, who
are sometimes displaced by indirect action and
pollution.
As the largest buyer of soy in the global market, China can contribute to the adoption of
sustainable practices worldwide. Claims of land
grabbing have flourished in the absence of
transparency, and even though they lack evidence, the expansion of soy and other industrial
crops threatens local food security and climate
resilience. In turn, countries such as Argentina
need to strengthen their climate change mitigation and adaptation funds; from preventing deforestation to ensuring food systems
resilience, reliance on a single crop may pose
more risks than benefits in the medium term.

China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

Cattle raising and deforestation in Brazil
China is the largest foreign consumer of Brazilian beef, a commodity expanding at the expense of forested areas in the Cerrado and Amazon regions.
Agriculture and land-use change account for
more than half of Brazil’s greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. The country’s fourth biennial update
report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, submitted in 2020,
presents GHG emissions inventory with data as
recent as 2016 (presented in the carbon dioxide [CO2] equivalent of Global Warming Potentials Second Assessment Report [GWP-SAR],
by sector). According to the report, agriculture
accounted for 33.6 percent of emissions, and
land-use change for 22.3 percent, with the remaining 32.4 percent corresponding to the energy sector.46 Industrial processes (6.9 percent)
and waste treatment (4.8 percent) are dwarfed
by 55.9 percent of combined agriculture, landuse change, and forestry.
In 2016, Brazil featured seventh in the list of
the world’s biggest GHG emitters, with about
half of the country’s emissions coming from deforestation. In 2021, the country is still among
the world’s top ten GHG emitters, as shown by
the World Resources Institute Climate Watch
tool. In 2018, Brazil was responsible for 1.42
gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) of the total 3.96 GtC
emitted by Latin America and the Caribbean.47
Between 2015 and 2017, the largest export
markets for Brazilian beef, offal, and live cattle were Hong Kong and mainland China, which
together purchased 30.2 percent of Brazil’s exports by volume.48 In total, China’s imports of
Brazilian beef are linked to an emissions risk of
13.1 million tons of CO2.49

Chinese demand for beef did not start the ongoing process of deforestation and land-use
change in Brazil. The Amazon region did not even
produce enough beef to feed its population until 1991. Brazil’s internal demand for beef has
increased, and new land had to be converted
to pasture to ensure production. The land-use
changes primarily affected the Cerrado, which
is responsible for half of Brazil’s cattle and beef
production;50 Atlantic Forest (15-20 percent of
Brazil’s total cattle production, deforested in
the twentieth century),51 and later, the Brazilian
Amazon region.52
Between 1997 and 2003, the volume of beef
exports increased more than fivefold, from
232,000 to nearly 1.2 million metric tons in carcass weight equivalent. Reportedly, 80 percent
of the growth in livestock production took place
in the Amazon and was largely export-driven.53
The PRC cannot satisfy its internal market for
beef,54 which has prompted China to look for resources in Latin America, leading to deforestation and environmental degradation.
In 2012, Brazilian beef exports grew 7.8 percent
compared to the previous year, and deforestation in the Amazon region began to increase
again after eight years of decline. By 2017,
70 percent of China’s beef imports came from
South America, and in 2018, China purchased
50 percent more beef from Brazil than the year
before.55
To date, two-thirds of cleared land in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes have been converted
to cattle pasture, “making the Brazilian cattle
sector responsible for one-fifth of all emissions
from commodity-driven deforestation across
the entire tropics.”56
Brazilian cattle producers and commodity companies are known for using a loophole in federal law to hide cattle-driven deforestation; the
term “laundering” cattle refers to the practice
of making it seem like livestock were not raised
on land recently deforested.57 During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, in particular, the country
significantly weakened its environmental regulations and restricted the budget allocated to
law enforcement in forested areas, allowing for
these practices to spread. Bolsonaro has also
accused Indigenous groups of holding back the
country’s economic prosperity.58
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China is not solely responsible for Brazil’s adoption of unsustainable farming practices, but its
growing demand is untimely. The Amazon region is approaching its deforestation tipping
point and has run out of land59 that can be
sustainably farmed. Deforestation has already
reached a 15 percent rate, compared to the
Amazon’s 1970s extent of more than 6 million
square kilometers (km). More than 19 percent of
the Brazilian Amazon has disappeared. Environmental researchers Carlos Nobre and Thomas
Lovejoy have warned that “if just 20–25 percent
of the rainforest were cut down, it could reach
a tipping point at which eastern, southern and
central Amazonia would flip to a savannah-like
ecosystem.”60
However, the link between international demand and deforestation is not direct. Brazilian
cattle ranchers are not deforesting new areas
to raise cattle sold in the international market.
It is more likely that foreign demand is sourcing
beef raised in areas with a low agricultural impact on the forest and displacing local market
cattle raising toward areas with high environmental impact. This phenomenon is pushing the
domestic market toward regions with high rates
of land-use change and deforestation.61
The phenomenon of cattle laundering is possible due to the number of confluent interests
surrounding arable land (forested or not). Beef
exports are mostly sourced from areas with
lower deforestation risk than domestically consumed beef.
According to Zu Ermgassen et al., beef exports
grew 30 percent in the last decade, moving into
frontier regions by 2017 and displacing domestic production elsewhere. No direct correlation between beef exports and the expansion
of pastureland into forested areas was found,
but an indirect one can be reconstructed when
taking other crops into account. While “the pasture area in Brazil has been relatively stable
since 2005 at approximately 180 Mha [million
hectares],”62 cropland for soy and sugar cane
showed an increase of 19.2 Mha between 2005
and 2017, “with the majority of expansion occurring onto pasture, which, in turn, has expanded into forest.”63 This complex dynamic
creates the conditions for cattle and deforestation to be insufficiently reported.
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Research conducted by Trase, a partnership between the Stockholm Environment Institute and
Global Canopy, focuses on spatially-mapping
cattle exports to assess the risk of deforestation in different Brazilian provinces. Tracking
the supply chain allowed Trase to estimate cattle-associated deforestation risks for various
markets and countries that purchase beef from
Brazil, including its own internal market. These
measures allowed Trase to estimate how likely it was for a particular country or region to
purchase beef raised on deforested land. The
deforestation risk attributed to each represents
the chances of sourcing cattle products from
recently deforested land. It does not establish causality between the purchased beef and
cleared land.
Trase’s research found that international buyers
tend to purchase beef from areas where local
governments were “relatively consolidated,”64
meaning they have well-developed agricultural sectors and deforestation is less recent than
in municipalities supplying the domestic market. Trase’s findings show a stark deforestation
risk for Brazil’s internal market compared to the
international market. In the 2015-2017 period,
Brazil’s internal market purchased 80.9 percent
to 82.4 percent of its total beef production, incurring an 85.8 percent to 86.8 percent deforestation risk each year. For the same period, the
remaining 17.9 percent to 19.1 percent of Brazil’s total beef production was destined for the
international market, which bore a significantly
lower deforestation risk of between 13.2 percent and 14.2 percent.
China’s exposure to cattle-associated deforestation was the highest among the international consumers that make up the 17.9 to
19.1 percent segment. Under the PRC’s current sourcing conditions, the beef purchased
showed an estimated 21.7 percent to 31.3 percent of all export-associated deforestation risk,
estimated at 15,900 to 23,000 ha per year.65
These estimations should have considerable
effects on the PRC’s sourcing policies, as nearly
half of the meat imported by China over the past
year came from Brazil.66
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Considerations of animal health and welfare
could reduce this risk, as the researchers reported “a notable difference in deforestation
risk of imports arriving into ports in mainland
China versus Hong Kong, driven by disparities in
their sanitary requirements and slaughterhouse
approval processes.”67 On a positive note, if China were to implement policies to reduce deforestation risk, there should be room to integrate
animal rights provisions.
Satisfying China’s growing demand for Latin America’s natural resources under business-as-usual practices has caused significant
damage to local ecosystems and the global
climate. If Latin American countries’ efforts to
trade with China do not factor in the increasing
urgency to address climate change mitigation
strategies, the region’s forests—and the Amazon, in particular—are likely to disappear and
reach the point of irreversibly turning their largest rainforest from a carbon sink to a carbon
emitter. Curbing emissions from deforestation
has become more urgent than ever, considering the Amazon rainforest is currently releasing
more carbon than it absorbs.68
Latin American countries and Brazil, in particular, need to close the legal loopholes that
incentivize deforestation as a viable source of
production. Chinese demand can contribute
to preventing deforestation risks by tightening
sourcing requirements and integrating animal
welfare requirements. Land-use change is a
local issue with global impact, and the international community needs to consider alternative development models for food systems that
center sustainability for local communities and
advance climate change mitigation goals.

Copper extraction and socio-environmental
conflict in Peru
Copper is one of the main commodities sought
by China from Latin America. This mineral has
been employed to allow China’s urbanization
process and is used in electricity transmission.
It is also an important component of the technology required to fuel its energy transition to
renewable energies. For this reason, there is
significant interest from transnational companies to manage the reserves worldwide, making
the global copper market highly concentrated
and subject to the supervision of international
antitrust authorities.
After the United States, China has become Peru’s most important trading partner, the primary
market for its exports, and the second-most important source of its imports. The PRC is present in the Peruvian mining industry as a buyer and, most importantly, as a direct investor.
Peru is also considered the leading destination
for Chinese mining investment in Latin America,
with Chinese firms comprising around 36 percent of the country’s total mining investment
portfolio.69
This economic relationship has been beneficial
for Peru, as Chinese demand for minerals helped
the country overcome the 2008 global financial
crisis. Yet, this relationship has not been free
from socio-environmental conflict, as is briefly
addressed in the Las Bambas case study below.
As mentioned, the case of Las Bambas is a
unique example of how global authorities can
mandate a change of management in a highly
concentrated market such as copper, affecting
activities locally and unintentionally sparking
conflict. Although this is a unique case and not
representative of the Peruvian copper industry
or Chinese mining companies in the country, it
shows that if Latin American countries are unprepared to prevent the risks that international
mergers may create locally, extractive industry operations are likely to continue facing socio-environmental conflict to the detriment of
local livelihoods.
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Las Bambas is in the Peruvian highland region
of Apurímac. The operation overlaps the districts of Challhuahuacho, Tambobamba, and
Coyllurqui (Cotabambas province), at an altitude
ranging between 3,800 and 4,600 meters above
sea level.
The mine is considered one of the biggest copper reserves in the world and contains more
than 1.08 million tons of copper concentrate.
Glencore-Xstrata managed the project and, in
2013, was ordered to sell the mine as a condition for the Chinese antitrust authority to authorize the merger of the two companies.
The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)70 that
went into effect on August 1, 2008,71 provides
that all corporate mergers, acquisitions, or
takeovers for companies with a significant nationwide turnover (within China)72 had to obtain
clearance from the Antimonopoly Bureau of the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).73 Article 3 of
the AML establishes that these concentrations
are subject to approval as they may lead to the
elimination or restriction of competition.74
Through their conditional approval, MOFCOM
established a series of requests to Glencore.
Relevant to this case, Glencore was instructed
to divest75 from all of its equity interest in Las
Bambas within the year following this decision
and before June 30, 2015. The project was then
acquired by MMG, the international unit of China MinMetals, a Chinese company, for US$5.85
billion. The company started operating the mine
in 2015.76
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
for the Las Bambas project contemplated the
construction of a mining pipeline expected to
extend over 200km. This infrastructure would
reach the province of Espinar (Cusco), which
opposed its construction.
Soon after the project was sold to MMG, several
modifications were made to it and the EIA. One
of them involved canceling the pipeline’s construction and building a processing plant in the
area.77 With these modifications, the 450,000
tons produced yearly would be transported in trucks along a road that crosses several
neighboring peasant communities. Traffic was
thought to negatively impact noise and air pollution and the safety of the community, along
with the risk of accidents, including toxic substance spillage.
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Neighboring communities were not consulted
regarding these changes in the EIA. Public participation mechanisms78 were required by law at
the time of obtaining the EIA but didn’t apply
to unsubstantial modifications that could be
expedited through a process called the technical support report (ITS). Although not legally required, the relationship built when Glencore-Xstrata owned the mining concession
deteriorated because of the lack of consultation.
The claims arose after a communal road within the Yavi Yavi estate was declared a “national
road” at the end of 2017, allowing ore-loaded
trucks to transport material to and from the
port of Matarani (Arequipa). Yavi Yavi is within
the community’s territory, and the construction
was prompted by the company’s decision not
to build the planned mining pipeline. A national
road allows heavy vehicles carrying ore and potentially toxic chemicals to transit.
This situation has sparked socio-environmental conflict that persists to this day. Communities perceive that the modification to the EIA
is substantial, but the Peruvian environmental
authority considered it a minor change; the ITS
does not require consultation.
The road facilitates the daily passage of approximately 300 trucks loaded with minerals, which,
according to the protesting local communities,
causes significant environmental impact in the
area (dust, noise, vibrations, etc.) that could
have been avoided with the infrastructure as
originally planned.79
The former Vice Minister of Mining Pedro Gamio
warned in 2015 that suspending the pipeline
could generate impacts that were not reported to the population in the mining project’s EIA.
He also warned of possible unrest and protests
from the local population.80
This case indicates the role that Latin American countries’ decisions play in how foreign investments are perceived. As previously stated,
environmental impact and socio-environmental
conflict are not inherently how China operates
in the region, but instead are a product of Latin
American countries’ lack of adequate planning
to satisfy the scope of China’s demand for natural resources.
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As researcher Carlos Monge points out, the
protests surrounding the Las Bambas mining project “signal profound shortcomings in
mining governance in Peru, particularly with
respect to the way the national mining sector authorities handle and approve changes in mining project design and environmental impact assessments (EIAs).”81 The case
is an example of how the government failed
to foresee the potential risks arising from a
change in management of the mine and did
not prioritize the local community’s concerns.

Despite differences in production practices and
supply chain characteristics among renewable
and non-renewable commodities, the most important aspect of PRC-Latin American trade is
the increasing pressure on natural resources
it generates. Latin American countries are not
making changes in their production strategies
to face this pressure, nor doing nearly enough
to ensure sustainable production. Instead,
they are maintaining or adopting unsustainable
practices that decrease their socio-environmental resilience.

LOOKING FORWARD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN THE GROWING RELATIONSHIP

To increase their socio-environmental resilience
and ensure their products are sustainable in the
long-term, Latin American countries can learn
from their experience in other sectors—such as
mining and agriculture—and apply the lessons
to growing industries like energy generation
and pork farming.

China is a determining factor in Latin America’s
landscape, and substantial degradation can be
attributed—either directly or indirectly—to the
commodities it consumes. The impact on food
systems, deforestation, and water scarcity has
been described throughout the report. However, these unsustainable practices are not more
inherently Chinese than Latin American.
This report has offered a broad view of the environmental costs of the Chinese-Latin American trade and investments relationship. It
analyzed several industries integral to the collaboration, focusing on sustainability, climate
change mitigation, and adaptation. The following refers to two growing partnerships in which
China plays an essential role: the transition to
renewable energy, which will allow countries to
cut emissions from electricity generation, and
the growing demand for pork, which would increase greenhouse gas emissions and require
additional resources to maintain the herds.

Leading the energy transition: China’s contribution to clean energy adoption
On the opposite side of conflict, deforestation, and carbon-intensive activities, the relationship between China and Latin America
has also helped some countries transition to
renewable energy technologies. Chile, for example, has managed to achieve its goal of 20
percent non-conventional renewable energy in
record time, thanks to some decisive legal requirements in its energy sector that allowed for
the adoption of renewable energy technologies
partly sourced from China.
Chile had been reliant on Argentina’s natural gas as its primary source of low-emissions
energy. In 1995, the two countries signed a
protocol that provided the framework for privately-owned companies to secure contracts
between natural gas producers in Argentina
and Chilean consumers. The infrastructure built
to support this system involved large north-tosouth pipelines, natural gas power plants, and
distribution facilities. As a result, by 2004, Chile
imported almost 15 percent of Argentina’s natural gas production.82
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Also in 2004, the Argentine economic crisis
caused the government to set stringent export
constraints on natural gas, bringing disruptive
results to natural gas exports to Chile.83 Given
its installed capacity and dependency on natural gas, Chile had to look for alternative sources to guarantee energy security, which laid the
groundwork for its renewable energy transition.
Then-President Michelle Bachelet stated that
“by 2010, 15 percent of the new generation
capacity must be produced through renewable
energy sources.”84
At the same time, China was experiencing an
excess in its production of photovoltaic panels.
Between 2008 and 2013, the country’s solar
panel industry dominated the market, dropping
world prices by 80 percent, reportedly changing the economics of solar energy worldwide.85
Chile seized the opportunity to rapidly expand
its solar energy generation.
The trade relationship between Chile and China
is not different from the rest of the region. Imports for Chile are concentrated in renewable
energy technologies, and Chile’s exports focus
on raw materials. Chile is among the world’s
foremost producers of copper and lithium, two
of the minerals for which China is the top buyer
globally. China represents about 25 percent of
the world’s demand for lithium, which it transforms into batteries that allow for renewable energy technologies, energy storage, and electric
mobility to be sold globally and within the PRC.
China currently represents 56 percent of world
sales of electric cars,86 successfully greening its
transportation system.
In 2013 alone, Chile imported more than half
of its solar panels from China for a total value of US$40.9 million. While a small portion of
its overall energy generation, this number has
continued to grow, with a majority of new projects powered by renewable energy87 along with
Chile’s increasingly ambitious climate change
mitigation commitments.
After entering the Paris Agreement in 2015,
Chile approved its Roadmap (Hoja de Ruta) to
2050. The plan proposed an ambitious goal of
generating 70 percent of its energy matrix from
renewable sources by 2050, emphasizing solar
and wind energy.88 One of its midterm goals is to
become the leading provider of technology and
services for the solar energy industry by 2035
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in Latin America. Chile may be well en route to
achieving these goals, aided by its partnership
with China.
China has become a reliable source of green
energy technologies for Latin America, not only
through solar panels but also by providing electric vehicles that have helped countries like
Colombia and Chile reduce urban emissions.
As recently as December 2020, the Bogotá
City Public Transport Authority (Transmilenio)
received more than 1,000 electric buses from
Chinese private actor BYD Co. Ltd. BYD has a
market share of more than 96.5 percent in the
Colombian electric bus market and 99 percent
in Bogotá specifically.89 Prior to this, Santiago
had the largest electric fleet in Latin America,
with buses supplied by Chinese companies
BYD, Yuting, and King Long.90
However, the development of green energy generation technologies has a high environmental
cost for Chile and other Latin American countries, where the minerals needed for the global
energy transition are extracted.
Chile’s relationship with the PRC has contributed to the low-emissions development of its energy grid. But producing the commodities that
China and the international market demand
puts a high toll on natural resources, particularly the extraction of water required for lithium
production in the Atacama salt flats, one of the
most arid places in the world.
The future of pork farming: environmental
and human health concerns
Unlike most of the cases referenced previously,
China’s negotiations with Argentina to double
its industrial pork population is an issue unique
to the PRC’s cultural and social preferences. In
its absence, the project would not be substituted by any other country. If anything, Argentina’s
role as a supplier is the only interchangeable
factor and a potential source of vulnerability for
the country.
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Negotiations between leaders of the PRC and
Argentina came to the spotlight in 2020, when
the news of a projected installation of 25 pig
farms (of about 12,500 pigs each) started making headlines.91 The current industrial pig population in the country amounts to 350,000 animals, and this venture would almost double that
number.
Concerns over the ecological footprint of this
endeavor are not unfounded. The farms would
extend over land in Argentina’s northern provinces, which are already facing harsh drought
seasons, a source of concern for local communities. In addition to increasing water demand,
farming such a large number of animals would
require sourcing animal feed, managing solid
waste and wastewater, and would significantly
raise the country’s methane emissions. Moreover, pig farms worldwide have been facing insurmountable losses due to outbreaks of the
African Swine Flu (ASF). Both outbreaks and
ASF prevention pose risks to environmental and
human health because of the zoonotic potential
of the disease, insufficient capacity to deal with
animal remains, or the spread of antibiotic and
antimicrobial resistance.
As for the animal feed, Argentina currently sells
more than half of its agricultural products—
soybeans in particular—to the PRC. China relies on soy imports to feed its pork population,
which constitutes half the world’s swine. The
water footprint of this exchange is considerable; soybeans are used to fatten pigs, and their
production requires about 1,500 tons of water
per ton of soybeans.92 As the current production
of soybeans in the region is already spoken for,
the new pork farms would increase the demand
for soy and put additional pressure on Argentine producers and neighboring countries with
arable land.

Cattle farming is already responsible for around
25 percent of GHG emissions in Argentina,93
and about 40 percent of these are linked to
the Argentina-PRC trade relationship. In 2018,
550,503 tons of beef were exported by Argentina, of which 207,000 were sold to China.94 The
expansion of pork farming in the country would
considerably set back any climate change mitigation goals, as farming cattle and pork is one
of the main sources of GHG emissions, emitting
methane and nitrous oxide.
As mentioned before, the primary concern regarding the sustainability of the China-Latin
America relationship is how cumulative environmental degradation may push Latin American countries closer to their tipping points,
stages from which ecosystems would be unable
to bounce back.
The relationship between Argentina and China
has evolved rapidly over the last few decades,
with the two countries entering a commercial
association agreement in 2004 that scaled up
to a strategic commercial association in 2014.
The installation of 25 pig farms would ensure
the reliable supply of 900,000 yearly tons of
pork meat to the PRC after ASF decimated the
Asian country’s pork population.95 Currently,
Spain and Germany are the principal suppliers
of pork meat to China, and their pig populations
are affected by the same epidemic.
Given these animal health concerns, those
against the project, including local environmental groups Climate Save Movement and Extinction Rebellion,96 argue that besides outsourcing
its production, China is exporting a business
model with pandemic potential.

The construction of these farms would considerably raise Argentina’s methane emissions, a
GHG that has more than 80 times the warming
potential of carbon dioxide in the short term
and is released in the liquefaction of manure,
a common practice in industrial animal farming.

18

An unofficial draft of the Memorandum of Understanding between China and Argentina was
published by a local newspaper in July 2021.
The text contemplated installing “circular economy farms,” which would prioritize a production model that includes location, logistics,
solid waste and wastewater treatment, energy,
slaughtering, and refrigeration.97 The Argentine
Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the veracity
of this draft agreement.98 The official negotiation has been carried out privately, involving
high-level decision-makers from the Argentine
Ministries of Agriculture, Production, and Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic sources had mentioned
the agreement would be finalized by September 2021.99 Though Argentina joined the Belt
and Road Initiative in February 2022, during the
meeting between presidents Fernández and Xi,
there has been no official statement about the
negotiations of the pork farms.
The secrecy of these negotiations raised concerns among the population, with good reason.
Increasing the country’s pork production capacity entails direct and indirect effects on environmental, animal, and human health. To meet
internal demands for pork, the PRC adopted unsustainable practices that cost them water and
soil pollution from nutrient overload on land and
in waterways,100 increased GHG emissions, and
suffered a loss in genetic and species diversity.
The prophylactic overuse of antibiotics
throughout the production cycle has raised
public health concerns about the emergence of
antibiotic-resistant strains of disease-causing
organisms that compromise the ability of medicines to treat disease in both humans and other
animals.101 As for the three main ways in which
livestock can harness antibiotic resistance and
constrain environmental and human health,
Mindi Schneider said that “drugs fed to animals
are excreted in manure, and are then carried into
the environment via runoff from feeding operations;”102 antibiotics in soil and water can then
kill microorganisms and leave resistant bacteria
to spread. Finally, this process can happen in
the digestive systems of animals and get transferred to the soil when manure is applied as fertilizer. “Similarly, gene-sharing can occur across
different species, for instance through fecal
bacteria found in meat products.”103
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For Argentina, achieving the goal of producing
and exporting nearly a million tons of pork meat
per year would severely increase pressure over
land and water, present solid waste challenges,
and pose public health concerns.
But for China, securing a steady supply of pork
may be an issue of social and political stability.
Pork is the chief source of protein for the Chinese population, and “when the price of pork
rises, discontent is often not far behind.”104 This
was the case in 2019-20 after the ASF ravaged
the country’s herd.
A different kind of unrest troubled the PRC in
2021 when the price of pork plummeted more
than 54 percent in the first half of the year,
“driven mainly by panic selling because of new
African swine fever outbreaks.”105 The instability
of the “pig cycle” has been attributed to smaller,
less efficient farms and the alterations caused
by ASF outbreaks.
In any case, the volatility of this market, together with the environmental and public health
risks that the new Argentine herds would pose,
makes the future of pork farming a relevant
concern for Latin America’s development plans.

COMMON THEMES AND TAKEAWAYS: INCREASING CHALLENGES UNDER CLIMATE
CHANGE
As adequately put, “the key issue is not whether
a company is Chinese, or of any other nationality, but rather the willingness and ability of host
countries to regulate them appropriately.”106
Many Latin American countries are running out
of non-deforested land for farming. Others are
brewing socio-environmental conflict around
extractive industries and land-use change.
Most Latin American countries have inadequate
regulations or have shown an unwillingness
to enforce their existing environmental provisions; therefore, failing to adapt to the context
of growing demand and urgency to implement
sustainable strategies.

China’s Investments and Land Use in Latin America

China has been an important driver in the expansion of agriculture and extraction; Latin
American countries’ agriculture and extractive
exports to China as a share of GDP have been
rising, while exports to the rest of the world have
remained stagnant or fallen.107 This is to be expected when it comes to developing countries.
As per capita income increases, global south
countries will struggle to satisfy their internal
demand for resources, the traditional developed economies’ demand, and the growing demand of other developing and middle-income
countries, such as China.
While unsurprising, the problem with this phenomenon is that the increased demand arrives
in Latin America when the region and its countries lack consensus on their local development
plans and priorities. There is no evidence that
China can be held responsible for Latin America’s failure to diversify the region’s export markets and expand economic activity outside of
the natural resource sectors. However, in practice, Latin American countries are diverting their
most productive soil, water, and overall environmental health to producing commodities for the
rest of the world, often to the detriment of their
populations’ local food systems and health.
Argentina and Brazil, two of the countries in
our case studies, are among the world’s biggest net exporters of soil.108 When exporting to
world markets, Latin American countries are not
only selling grains, meat, fossil fuels, or minerals, they are also exporting the environmental
goods and services employed to produce these
commodities, causing both immediate and longterm effects on local communities. For example,
Chilean lithium production is fueling the world’s
renewable energy transition while depriving its
local communities of adequate water for growing food.

Both Latin America and China are reproducing
the roles assigned to them in international markets. Food and minerals are what Latin American countries have historically relied on for
trade. At the same time, China’s consumption
levels are not beyond expectations for a middle-income country. What is concerning is that
Latin America is not adopting practices to maintain this relationship sustainably at a time when
the world is getting closer to its tipping point,
thresholds beyond which an ecosystem reorganizes, often abruptly or irreversibly.109 Once this
point is reached, certain environmental impacts
can no longer be avoided, even if remediation is
implemented later.
The factors contributing to this phenomenon
should not be understood as isolated from one
another. Climate change is a complex ongoing
process with multiple inputs. Ecosystems are
subject to various interconnected drivers, and
the continuing trends of deforestation and land
conversion in the Amazon “may have important consequences for the sustainability of the
region’s remaining natural vegetation”110 and,
with it, its biodiversity, critical ecosystems, food
sources, water availability, and air quality.
Replacing forests with pastures reduces ecosystem services on which biodiversity and
weather depend. First, the loss of habitat for
wildlife prompts interactions with domestic animals and people, posing a public health risk.
Second, loss of shade, refractive capacity, and
other thermoregulatory services to which forest
coverage contributes (such as evapotranspiration and albedo) increase the heat flux and
dryness at surface level, affecting the stability
of local ecosystems and their ability to self-regulate and recover from environmental damage.
Argentina and Uruguay are already feeling the
effects; both have experienced lower harvest
yields in 2019 and 2020 due to drought.111
The impact of land conversion has been studied
in the Brazilian Amazon and Cerrado regions.112
By substituting local ecosystems with crops for
pasture, the result is warming at the replacement site and nearby locations. An increase in
local temperature can add up to extreme heat,
which, in turn, can damage many economic and
social activities, including agricultural productivity, as crops get exposed to maximum temperatures113 for longer periods.
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Climate change experts have warned that increased deforestation and carbon emissions
could drive the Amazon to its tipping point: a
state beyond which the drier climate would
make the rainforest unable to support itself,
starting a process of transformation into a savannah ecosystem. The Amazon is already releasing more carbon than it absorbs;114 curbing
emissions is more urgent than ever.
According to the Climate Action Tracker,115
global climate policies are putting the planet
on track to increase from 2.7 to 3.1 degrees
Celsius above preindustrial levels. This rise in
temperature alone would be enough to trigger
the Amazon’s savannization.116 However, the
process can be accelerated by the confluence
of multiple factors, like tree cover loss. A reduction in precipitation and humidity is predicted to
become more evident when deforestation exceeds 40 percent of the original forest extent,117
with different outcomes expected from patchy
small-scale deforestation to large-scale forest
cover loss.
Compared to other exports and overall economic activities, products sold from the Latin
American region to China have caused more net
GHG emissions and used more water per dollar
of output.118
In addition, the industries producing commodities to trade with China are often embedded in
social conflict for natural resources—particularly access to water sources. Therefore, there
is reason to believe production for the Chinese
markets is more likely to be associated with socio-environmental conflict if not managed appropriately by Latin American countries.
The main concern remains that Latin American countries have been unable or unwilling to
adapt sustainable production practices, despite
the evidence mentioned above and the urgency
to implement mitigation strategies. There is not
enough evidence to argue that Chinese demand
for natural resources is uniquely unsustainable
or that China’s foreign direct investments adopt
worse practices than other actors in these industries. Some maintain that Chinese firms
have not performed significantly worse relative
to domestic or other international firms. In fact,
“Chinese firms outperform their competitors,
especially with proper incentives from governments and civil society.”119
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The way in which Latin American countries have
approached their trade relationship with the
PRC, maintaining outdated production practices or weakening environmental protections, has
led the economic collaboration to imperil local
ecosystems, reaching unsustainable conditions. As their failure to adapt impacts the global climate, the nature of China-Latin America
cooperation will continue to raise concerns of
environmental justice across borders.
Takeaways
(i) The practices of Chinese companies vary
greatly depending on the sector. Most of
their impact is caused by the characteristics of the resources under extraction, the
availability of arable land, or the standard
practices of the industry. One thing in common is that China demands large volumes of
products from countries already at capacity
to serve their domestic and foreign markets.
Legal loopholes, market incentives, and
weak oversight create the conditions for
Chinese demand to push the expansion of
the agricultural frontier for the production
of commodities such as beef and soy. This
indirect effect could be prevented with a
robust and adaptable legal system and the
adoption of sustainability standards within
the private sector. In addition, China could
reduce its deforestation risk in the beef
supply chain by enforcing better sourcing
standards, such as those related to animal
welfare and tracking indirect deforestation.
(ii) Latin American countries need to pay special attention to investments in highly concentrated markets and the decisions of foreign antitrust authorities that may influence
local project management. Both the lithium
and copper cases covered in this report
involved Chinese companies that acquired
a participation in mining concessions that
were already operating. The frameworks
governing environmental impact assessments are often insufficient to ensure adequate communication with local communities and prevent the risk of conflict. Ensuring
transparency and public participation in
extractive projects is the first step toward
preventing conflict and reaching consensus
over management decisions, thus ensuring
sustainable operations over time.
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(iii) The scarcity of agricultural land is a real
threat to conservation, food security, and
climate change mitigation. Though the allegations of land grabbing have not been
substantiated with data on property transfers, the agricultural industry is increasingly
adopting rental and production agreements
as a strategy to secure land use. These
strategies could contribute to the dispossession of local communities if the rental
or production agreements are not carefully
negotiated between companies and landowners. Latin American countries need to
pass clear policies for the development of
these agreements, prioritizing rural livelihoods and Indigenous communities’ development goals.

(iv) The policies that traditionally worked for Latin American countries need revision in light
of climate change. Water scarcity, methane
emissions, and deforestation tipping points
are not only threatening local livelihoods
but affecting the global climate. Countries
committing to expanding their production
of commodities are doing so at the cost of
human and environmental health. Plans to
duplicate industrial pork farming in Argentina create multiple threats and expose the
country to a highly vulnerable arrangement
with unclear advantages for the local population. Pork farming in Asia and Europe is
affected by recurring epidemics that decimate their production; without clear animal
welfare standards, the Argentine herds will
also be vulnerable. If these projects were to
move forward, Argentina would need to reassess its climate change mitigation commitments and update its methane budgets
to manage emissions and animal waste.
In turn, China would need to pass better
sourcing standards to prevent antibiotic
resistance and health concerns. All of Latin America would need to watch for an increased demand for soy for animal feed and
the risk of deforestation that comes with it.
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